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THE ANDEAN ELECTRICITY MARKET:
A COMPETITION LAW ANALYSIS
MATEO FERRERO*
ABSTRACT
The countries of the Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru) have great potential to produce clean and reliable
energy. However, this potential has only been exploited to a limited
extent. Network industries, such as the electricity sector, have special
features that create unique challenges for both developed and develop-
ing countries seeking to adequately manage this important part of the
economy. Although the member countries of the Andean Community have
substantially reformed their energy industries in the past decades, this
sector still requires further competition. So far, most of the efforts under-
taken by these countries have neglected the possibility of enhancing com-
petition in the energy market through deeper regional integration. This
Article explores the benefits and challenges of pursuing regional energy
market integration in the Andean Community by examining the current
Andean legal regime and comparing its most important aspects with the
regime implemented during the process of energy integration in the
European Union. The aim of this analysis is to propose several changes
to the Andean legal framework in order to improve the regional energy
integration regime from a competition law perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
Electricity is essential to the production of almost all goods and
services. Thus, it is vital to the public interest. Adequate, reliable, compet-
itively priced electricity is essential for modernization, domestic growth,
and international competitiveness. Despite its importance, many devel-
oping countries still struggle to guarantee the quality, the continuity, and
the long-term adequacy of the supply of electricity.1
Considering the fundamental role that the electricity industry
plays, many countries have restructured and liberalized their systems
over the past two decades.2 The experiences of the countries that em-
braced electricity reforms are mixed, ranging from highly successful in
some cases to disappointing and problematic in many others.3
Generally, the energy sector has improved in countries where
certain important reforms have been undertaken.4 These reforms have
included privatization, the implementation of effective and credible reg-
ulation aimed at encouraging efficient behavior by market participants,
and carefully structured wholesale markets that foster competition among
several unrelated suppliers.5
From a competition policy perspective, each of these reforms re-
quire making the following decisions: what kind of ownership—public or
private—is desirable in the industry; how to control market power in an
industry that is particularly sensitive to it; how to design the market to
progressively introduce competition; and finally, how to implement pub-
lic policies without distorting the playing field.
Each of these matters will be analyzed in the context of the
Andean Community, a regional integration bloc comprised of Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.6 The main objective of this Article is to
make a general assessment of the Andean electricity industry from a
competition law perspective, with a view to proposing improvements to
the current structure.
1 See IOANNIS N. KESSIDES, REFORMING INFRASTRUCTURE: PRIVATIZATION, REGULATION,
AND COMPETITION 137, 140 (2004).
2 Fereidoon P. Sioshansi & Wolfgang Pfaffenberger, Why Restructure Electricity Markets?,
in ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORM: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 35, 35 (Fereidoon P.
Sioshansi & Wolfgang Pfaffenberger eds., 2006).
3 Id.
4 KESSIDES, supra note 1, at 171–72.
5 Id.
6 Who Are We?, COMUNIDAD ANDINA [ANDEAN COMMUNITY], http://www.comunidadandina
.org/ingles/who.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
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I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON REGULATED MARKETS
A. Introductory Remarks on Regulated Markets
The structure and regulation of network utilities varied substan-
tially throughout the twentieth century, reflecting the regulatory complex-
ities of a market with unique characteristics and crucial importance for
economic development and political stability.7 For much of the twentieth
century, most countries used a system of government ownership and regu-
lation to promote access to network infrastructure, utilizing mechanisms
that ranged from non-exploitive pricing to non-discriminatory coverage
and universal service.8 In the 1980s and 1990s, liberalization and privati-
zation became the rule, marking a significant departure from the previous
model.9 This shift not only questioned the need for state ownership in
network utilities; it also challenged pre-existing conceptions about what
constituted a natural monopoly and what regulations were required to
address such phenomena.10
Network utilities are “public utilities that require a fixed network
to deliver their services, and include gas, electricity, water, rail, and fixed
link telephony.”11 The networks of these utilities are natural monopolies
because there are large economies of scale, and the fixed and sunk costs
of the infrastructure are a crucial part of the industry.12 In this situation,
the most efficient market solution is a monopoly. This infrastructure be-
comes an unavoidable natural monopoly when it is a key input to supply
the market; that is, when “it is something which is clearly non-replicable
on a commercial basis within a reasonable timescale and can therefore
be described as an ‘enduring economic bottleneck.’ ”13
The unique economic characteristics of network utilities make them
a target of government regulation. These features include: a) economies of
scale and scope that tend to create market concentration problems; b) large
sunk costs, which impose significant risks to investors and therefore
7 See KESSIDES, supra note 1, at 29–30.
8 Id. at 29.
9 Id. at 35.
10 Id.
11 DAVID M. NEWBERY, PRIVATIZATION, RESTRUCTURING, AND REGULATION OF NETWORK
UTILITIES: THE WALRAS-PARETO LECTURES 1 (1999).
12 MARK FURSE, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EC AND UK 228 (4th ed. 2004).
13 European Regulators Grp., ERG Opinion on Functional Separation, ERG (07) 44, at 5
n.3 (2007).
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discourage new participation in the industry; and c) the necessity of these
services to the society as a whole.14
The electricity industry’s three intrinsic characteristics make it
extremely vulnerable to the exercise of market power.15 First, “electricity
supply is rigid by nature.”16 Second, because electricity cannot be effi-
ciently stored,17 production and consumption occur at the same time.
Finally, the demand for electricity is severely inelastic in the short run.18
Prior to the market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, network util-
ities were designed based on the assumption that, due to the existence
of natural monopolies, “these industries were best served . . . when
structured as vertically integrated monopolies.”19 Vertical integration oc-
curs when organizations along the production chain are under a unified
management and ownership.20
Questioning this assumption led to the recognition that network
utilities “encompass several distinct activities with entirely different eco-
nomic characteristics—entailing a mix of competition and monopoly ele-
ments in supply.”21 Efficiently controlling these distinct activities requires
a combination of competition law and regulatory policy. Most activities
should be subject to progressive competition.22 However, cases of market
failure, including, but not limited to, natural monopoly, asymmetries of in-
formation, and network externalities, require the application of regulation.
These two approaches are necessary to ensure that competition has the
opportunity to develop to the point where it overcomes regulation as the
most efficient instrument to discipline the incumbent firm.23
14 KESSIDES, supra note 1, at 29–30.
15 Id. at 134.
16 Id. at 133.
17 Id. at 133–34.
18 Id. at 134.
19 Id. at 135–36.
20 Russell Johnston & Paul R. Lawrence, Beyond Vertical Integration—The Rise of the
Value-Adding Partnership, in MARKETS, HIERARCHIES AND NETWORKS: THE COORDINATION
OF SOCIAL LIFE 193, 199 (Grahame Thompson et al. eds., 1991).
21 KESSIDES, supra note 1, at 36.
22 Halil Baha Karabudak, Head of Dep’t II, Turk. Competition Auth., Presentation at the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Seminar on Competition Provisions
in Regional Trade Agreements: Competition Policy and Regulated Markets: Experience of
Turkey (Aug. 1, 2006), available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/ditc_ccpb
_turkey07-06_ppt05_en.pdf.
23 Mark Armstrong & David E. M. Sappington, Regulation, Competition, and Liberalization,
44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 325, 359 (2006).
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Concerns about excessive market power are sometimes addressed
by unbundling essential facilities in network utilities.24 “An ‘essential
facility’ is a facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors
cannot provide services to their customers.”25 When a provider has a whole-
sale market monopoly over an essential facility, competition in the retail
market may be at risk.26 Potential retail competitors will face high bar-
riers to entry if the incumbents are able to deny access to their network
or demand above-cost prices for its use.27
B. Electricity Restructuring
In the electricity industry, this change of paradigm meant that
its main components would be considered as separate sectors and thus,
progressively unbundled. Consequently, the electricity industry has been
restructured into four main components: a) generation; b) high-voltage
transmission; c) low-voltage distribution; and d) supply or retailing, which
includes power procurement, billing, and customer service.28
There are four main ways of organizing these sectors of the elec-
tricity market, depending on the depth of the reform that the country is
undertaking. The traditional approach is a monopoly, where a single ver-
tical integrated company generates the electricity and allocates it over a
transmission network to distribution companies or customers.29 A step
closer to competition is the “single buyer” model, in which a single com-
pany buys electricity from competing generators, but is a monopolist on
transmission and sales to distribution companies.30 The third approach is
“wholesale competition,” where several distribution companies compete
to buy electricity from competing generators, but still hold a monopoly in
their distribution areas.31 Finally, in the “retail competition” approach, com-
petition is enhanced throughout the production chain because customers
24 Harold Ware & Christian M. Dippon, Wholesale Unbundling and Intermodal Competition,
34 TELECOMM. POL’Y 54, 56 (2010), available at http://www.nera.com/extImage/PUB
_Wholesale_Competition_01.10.pdf (discussing unbundling in the context of telecom-
munications).
25 FURSE, supra note 12, at 288.
26 Ware & Dippon, supra note 24, at 56.
27 Id.
28 KESSIDES, supra note 1, at 132.
29 Id. at 144.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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have access to competing generators and the transmission and “distri-
bution networks operate under open access arrangements.”32
Although there are several options, there is agreement across
many countries on the basic architecture for electricity restructuring.33
The usual reform separates the natural monopoly segments from the
activities in which competition is possible.34 Accordingly, transmission
and distribution are separated from generation and retail.35 Wholesale
and retail competition, with a regulatory agency setting the tariffs for
transmission and distribution, is the standard recommendation.36 This
standard prescription and its sequencing should be, however, nuanced
and tailored to the needs of each country and region.37
Electricity restructuring initially aims at lowering downstream
costs, phasing out cross-subsidies and direct subsidies, and setting a sus-
tainable structure in the long run.38 Energy market reform should start
by unbundling transmission and upstream activities. The objective is to
put domestic power generation and long-distance imports on a competi-
tive footing while keeping transmission a public or private monopoly.39
A competitive wholesale market can be created by “unbundling” competi-
tive supplies of electricity from transmission.40 Some countries stop at
this point and keep energy market reform simple.41 Other countries go
further by partly or totally breaking up distribution and retail supply.42
There are two natural monopolies in the electricity market:
transmission and distribution.43 Both segments entail largely sunk fixed
costs44 and, as a result, introducing competition would lead to a wasteful
duplication of network resources. Thus, regulation is an appropriate tool
32 Id.
33 Id. at 145.
34 KESSIDES, supra note 1, at 145.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See id.
38 WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, ENERGY MARKET REFORM: LESSONS LEARNED AND NEXT
STEPS WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE ENERGY ACCESS PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 32 (2004).
39 Id. at 40.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. 
43 See Tooraj Jamasb & Michael Pollitt, Benchmarking and Regulation of Electricity
Transmission and Distribution Utilities: Lessons from International Experience 1
(Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, 2000).
44 KESSIDES, supra note 1, at 36.
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for monitoring the sector because it acts as a substitute for market forces
and ensures adequate supply and quality of service.45
The other crucial question, besides dealing with the natural mo-
nopoly segments in the industry, is how to introduce competition into the
competitive markets of the production chain: generation and supply. The
usual answer is that competition requires a market. Therefore, gener-
ation needs a wholesale electricity market ideally organized as a power
exchange. One of the most important advantages of this market-oriented
solution is that it raises “fewer concerns about the use of government
powers and the fairness of regulatory proceedings.”46 However, an ade-
quate competition-based model for electricity requires, at the very least,
enough capacity in the generation and transmission segments and sev-
eral independent competing generators.47
The objective of unbundling the different segments is to introduce
competition into segments that are not natural monopolies while contin-
uing to regulate the ones that are. Nonetheless, competition is not an end
in and of itself. Rather, it is an important means of achieving economic
efficiency and benefits for consumers. Reforming the electricity industry
requires a “tradeoff between vertically integrated and unbundled forms
of organization”; that is, between potential losses of coordination and in-
creases in transaction costs vis-à-vis potential efficiency gains from com-
petition and increased transparency.48
1. Distribution
Privatizing distribution helps to address revenue shortfalls by
introducing efficiencies at the segment of the business which is in direct
contact with end-users. Therefore, “[t]he best way to start and sustain
pricing and related reform is to separate the distribution monopoly from
the rest of the industry, privatize it, and subject it to price or revenue cap
regulation.”49 Nevertheless, the use of price caps poses challenges to the
regulator because distributors have the incentive of providing inflated in-
vestment forecasts in hopes that the regulator will set a higher price cap.50
45 Karabudak, supra note 22, at 10.
46 JOSÉ A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, CONTRACTS, AND
DISCRETION 35 (2003).
47 KESSIDES, supra note 1, at 142–43.
48 Id. at 46.
49 Id. at 146.
50 Graham Shuttleworth, Using Incentives to Inform Regulatory Decisions, ENERGY REG.
INSIGHTS (NERA ECON. CONSULTING), Aug. 2005, at 1, 2.
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A company following this approach would earn an extra profit from
“saving” costs, which were not intended in reality.51
2. Generation
Introducing competition into generation has frequently been done
by involving the private sector in such activity.52 As a general rule, the
private sector can become involved in generation when: a) the govern-
ment sells a controlling share in generation companies; or b) when the
government invites tenders from independent generators interested in
supplying the restructured state electricity company.53 If the first approach
is chosen—privatizing generation—it is crucial that the state electricity
company is separated into several companies that engage in competition.54
These competing companies must be structured with similar conditions
in terms of size and pre-existing contractual arrangements, as otherwise
a few would supply most of the contract-demanded energy.55
3. Transmission
Adequate transmission services are crucial to succeeding in re-
forming the electricity industry. The raison d’être for unbundling trans-
mission from generation is simple: a vertically integrated company would
probably favor the transportation of the energy generated by itself over
that of competing undertakings.56 The reliability of the transmission sec-
tor is crucial for enhancing competition at the generation level because
if the transmission capacity is insufficient, divided geographical markets
will arise because of congestion problems. As a result, operators with in-
creased market power would emerge in these geographical niches due to
fewer competitors.57 Accordingly, after separating transmission from
generation and creating conditions for regulated third-party access to
transmission, close regulation is necessary.
4. Wholesale Electricity Market
One of the most important elements of a successful restructuring
is the creation and adequate implementation of a wholesale electricity
51 Id.
52 See KESSIDES, supra note 1, at 144–45.
53 Id. at 147.
54 Id.
55 See id. at 148–55.
56 Id. at 147.
57 See id. at 59.
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market. There are several conditions required in order to succeed. First,
buyers and sellers should meet in a power exchange for entering into
spot transactions.58 Second, there should be several unaffiliated genera-
tors actively participating in the wholesale market.59 Third, numerous
purchasers should also be present in both long-term and short-term
markets.60 Finally, effective regulation should be present to address
market design imperfections.61
Spot markets have certain benefits from a competition policy point
of view: they guarantee efficient energy dispatch and, more importantly,
they reduce the possibility that generators exercise market power.62 In
any event, policymakers have several other mechanisms with which to
lessen market power. First, they can focus on preventing horizontal con-
centration at the generation sector.63 Second, policymakers can increase
investments in transmission capacity with a view toward impeding the
congestion of transmission lines.64 Finally, policymakers can encourage
the use of long-term contracts by, for instance, “requiring generators to
offer a portion of their expected annual sales in the form of long-term
forward contracts.”65
5. The Role of Regional Integration
Regional integration of electricity markets is particularly impor-
tant for many developing countries because they lack many of the char-
acteristics needed to have a healthy wholesale market. Namely, these
developing countries lack enough unaffiliated suppliers and enough
residential and industrial customers.66 As a result, countries found in
this situation should integrate with neighboring countries with a view
toward creating a larger energy market.
Integrating markets at the regional level is not only about having
strong and trustworthy interconnections. The countries taking part in a
58 KESSIDES, supra note 1, at 150.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 151.
62 Id. at 154.
63 Id. at 163.
64 KESSIDES, supra note 1, at 163.
65 Id.
66 See generally Keith Kozloff, Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries:
Implications for Renewable Energy (Renewable Energy Pol’y Project, Research Report
No. 2, 1998), available at http://www.repp.org/repp_pubs/articles/kozloff/kozloff.html (ex-
plaining the previous structure of power sectors in developing countries under the heading
“Characteristics of ‘Pre-Reform’ Power Sectors”).
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process of integration must enter into a stage of substantial regulatory
convergence. This regulatory convergence is, however, a difficult and
lengthy process. Thus, it is advisable to undertake such a task progres-
sively by initially establishing a regional agency to facilitate information
exchange and offer non-binding advice on matters such as standardi-
zation, interconnection, and pricing methodologies. Subsequently, coun-
tries should increase policy and regulatory coordination with the goal of
creating a regional regulatory authority.67
II. ANDEAN ENERGY INTEGRATION
A. Overview of Andean Community Law
The Andean Community was created by the Cartagena Agreement
in 1969 and currently comprises four countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
and Peru.68 Since its creation, the Andean Community has changed its
approach towards regional integration. The first stage of integration in the
Andean Community was a closed model based on an import substitution
strategy.69 After almost two decades of following this strategy, the region
found itself amid a serious economic crisis.70 In the late 1980s, the Andean
countries sought to relaunch their integration process on the basis of eco-
nomic opening and privatization.71
The main rules on intra-region trade are comprised of: a) the most-
favored nation clause; b) the national treatment clause; c) the prohibition
to impose tariffs or restrictions on community trade; and d) the auto-
matic and irreversible character of the integration process.72
The Andean Community has four main legal sources: a) the
provisions of the Cartagena Agreement; b) the decisions issued by
the Commission of the Andean Community; c) the Resolutions of the
67 KESSIDES, supra note 1, at 126.
68 Who Are We?, supra note 6.
69 About Us: Brief History, COMUNIDAD ANDINA [ANDEAN COMMUNITY], http://www
.comunidadandina.org/ingles/quienes/brief.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
70 Id.
71 See JORGE CASTRO BERNIERI, El Comercio Intracomunitario y el Mercado Común
Andino, in DERECHO COMUNITARIO ANDINO, 117, 117–18 (Allan R. Brewer Carías et al.
eds., 2003).
72 Id. at 121; see also Interpretación Prejudicial de los Artículos 45 y 54 del Acuerdo de
Cartagena [Prejudicial Interpretation of Articles 45 and 54 of the Cartagena Agreement],
Proceso No. 1-IP-90 (Tribunal de Justicia de la Comunidad Andina [Tribunal of Justice of
the Andean Community]), available at http://intranet.comunidadandina.org/Documentos
/Procesos/1-ip-90.doc (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
780 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 36:769
General Secretariat; and d) the judgments of the Court of Justice of the
Andean Community.73
Andean competition law is based on Articles 105 and 106 of
Chapter VIII of the Cartagena Agreement, which gives powers to the
Commission to enact the necessary legislation to prevent practices that
harm competition.74 These provisions also establish that the General
Secretariat is the body responsible for administering the regulations en-
acted by the Commission.75 On the basis of these provisions, the Andean
Community began enacting legislation governing competition matters
in the early 1970s.76 The first two Decisions were Decision 45/1971 and
Decision 230/1987, which were issued in the first stage of integration men-
tioned above.77 The third Decision, Decision 285/1991, was enacted in the
new context of deeper integration.78 Decision 285 regulated cases of re-
strictive agreements and abuse of dominance.79 It only applied when com-
petition was being affected in more than one Andean country and it did
not contain rules regarding merger review.80 The last instrument, ex-
plained in detail below, is Decision 608/2005.81
B. Energy Conditions in the Andean Countries
As a result of geographical and geological conditions, the Andean
Community has great opportunities to develop its hydropower and thermal
73 Jorge Castro Bernieri, La Regulación de la Competencia en la Comunidad Andina, GACETA
JURÍDICA DE LA UNIÓN EUROPEA Y DE LA COMPETENCIA, May–June 2000, at 49, 50.
74 Codification of Andean Subregional Integration Agreement, art. 105, May 26, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 910 (1969) [hereinafter Cartagena Agreement]; see also id. at 50.
75 See Bernieri, supra note 73, at 50–51.
76 See Francisco Marcos, Downloading Competition Law from a Regional Trade Agreement
(RTA): A New Strategy to Introduce Competition Law in Bolivia and Ecuador 4 (Instituto
de Empreso Business School, Working Paper No. WPED07-02, 2006).
77 See Decisiones [Decisions], COMUNIDAD ANDINA [ANDEAN COMMUNITY], http://intranet
.comunidadandina.org/IDocumentos/c_Newdocs.asp?GruDoc=07 (search “45” and also “230”
in the “Inicio” box under “Ingrese las Condiciones de Búsqueda” to pull up files of each
Decision in Spanish) (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
78 See Decision 285, COMUNIDAD ANDINA [ANDEAN COMMUNITY], http://www.comunidad
andina.org/ingles/normativa/d285e.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See Decisiones [Decisions], supra note 77 (search “608” in the “Inicial” box under
“Ingrese las Condiciones de Búsqueda” to pull up the file of the Decision in Spanish); see
also Competition, COMUNIDAD ANDINA [ANDEAN COMMUNITY], http://www.comunidad
andina.org/ingles/competition.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
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energy industries. According to the World Energy Council, the installed
capacity of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela is approxi-
mately forty-five gigawatts (“GW”).82 In addition, the Andean Countries
had twenty-five percent of the installed capacity of South America in
2007.83 Electricity demand in the Andean Community has been steadily
rising by 3.3% a year.84 Regional energy generation is diverse, and in-
cludes: hydropower, which accounts for fifty-nine percent of the gener-
ation; coal; gas; oil for thermal generation; and alternative energy sources,
such as wind or solar energy.85
The projections for energy demand in the region show that it will
continue to increase.86 Additionally, the Andean countries have a power
surplus in relation to the expected maximum demand.87 As a result, these
countries have the capacity to attend to their domestic electricity demand
and the surpluses are an opportunity to develop a regional energy market.88
C. Electricity Conditions in the 1990s and the Subsequent Reforms
In the early 1990s, the electricity system of the Andean countries
was facing a severe lack of the resources necessary to increase energy
supply and to maintain the existing infrastructure.89 In the case of energy,
the problems were particularly complicated, because constant price dis-
tortions and subsidies that had left the energy companies in a concerning
financial situation.90
As a result, several Andean countries began to thoroughly reform
their electricity industries. In general, these countries sought to foster
private investment in the sector by reducing their ownership in energy
companies and reserving the roles of policymaker and regulator to the
state.91 “In Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador regulation agencies were created,
82 WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, REGIONAL ENERGY INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN 17 (2008).
83 Id. at 16.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 16–17.
86 Id. at 16.
87 Id. at 13.
88 WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 82, at 13, 17.
89 Id. at 42.
90 MENTOR POVEDA, CAN. INT’L DEV. AGENCY, ORGANIZACIÓN LATINOAMERICANA DE ENERGÍA
(LATIN AM. ENERGY ORG.) & UNIV. OF CALGARY, COMPETENCIA EN MERCADOS ENERGÉTICOS:
EXPERIENCIAS DE LA OPERACIÓN DE MERCADOS ENERGÉTICOS EN LATINOAMÉRICA Y EL
CARIBE: LECCIONES APRENDIDAS 4 (2008).
91 WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 82, at 42.
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but linked to the [Energy] Ministries.”92 Conversely, “[i]n Colombia an
independent regulatory agency was created, . . . while the task of defining
policies was assigned to the Administration.”93 Venezuela, however, “did
not make any substantial change to the structure of its electric system.”94
Most Andean countries considered a fundamental step for reforming the
electricity industry to be the creation of wholesale electricity markets.95
The main objective was to introduce competition in the electricity system
with a view to improving a set of infrastructure that could not meet the
increasing demand for electricity.96
The energy industry in the Andean countries was mainly composed
of state-owned monopolies.97 Hence, when countries started to introduce
reforms, they decided to break up their energy companies to create sev-
eral independent entities.98 In some cases the state opted for full privat-
ization while in others it merely sold a share of its energy companies.99
The reforms to the energy sector also entailed a change in the man-
ner in which Andean countries regarded energy integration. Previously,
Andean countries were more focused on achieving self-supply of energy
than on searching for economic efficiency in the industry.100 Recently,
countries have started to seek synergies and complementarities between
themselves.101 The high reliance on hydropower generation made countries
in the region face electricity shortages when droughts occurred.102 As a
result, Andean Community members started to “encourage a more compre-
hensive energy integration that would improve the reliability of supply.”103
Andean energy integration has been enhanced through the follow-
ing measures: a) the enactment of Decision 536 in 2002, setting a general
framework for regional electricity interconnection and community elec-
tricity exchanges; b) the harmonization of the regulatory frameworks
of Colombia and Ecuador (Colombian Resolution CREG 004/2003 and
Ecuadorian Resolution CONELEC 002/2003); and c) the implementation
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 POVEDA, supra note 90, at 4.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See Genaro Arriagada, Petropolitics in Latin America: A Review of Energy Policy and
Regional Relations 9 (Inter-American Dialogue, Working Paper, 2006).
101 See WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 82, at 43.
102 Id. at 107.
103 Id. at 42.
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of the Coordinated Operation Scheme, in order to allow market coupling
between Colombia and Ecuador.104
Energy integration between Ecuador and Colombia through
International Electricity Transactions (“IETs”) has allowed significant
improvement in the electricity supply of both countries.105 These IETs
are governed by the efficiency principle, whereby the energy generated
in one country will only be dispatched in another country if it constitutes
an efficient service in that market.106 In particular, the IET framework
has contributed to decreasing the price for the importing country and
mitigating the risk of energy shortages in the short and mid-term.107
D. Current Andean Electricity Integration
Andean electricity integration is only at its initial phase because
the interconnection capacity is still scarce.108 At the moment there are
three main interconnection points within the Andean region: between
a) Colombia and Venezuela; b) Colombia and Ecuador; and c) Peru and
Ecuador.109 These points will likely be insufficient for all the cross-
border energy trade of the coming decades.
Due to the importance of upgrading the transmission net-
works and interconnection points, regional institutions, such as the
Corporación Andina de Fomento (“CAF”), a regional development
bank, and the Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura
Regional Suramericana (“IIRSA”) have joined efforts to develop proj-
ects in this direction.110
104 ASOCIACIÓN NACIONAL DE EMPRESAS DE SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS Y COMUNICACIONES
(“ANDESCO”) CÁMARA SECTORIAL DE ENERGÍA, ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DE LAS
TRANSACCIONES INTERNACIONALES DE ELECTRICIDAD EN EL MERCADO ANDINO 2–3
(2007) [hereinafter ANDESCO].
105 Id. at 1.
106 Id. at 4.
107 Id. at 1.
108 See WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 82, at 77–83 (discussing the main sub-
regional electricity infrastructure projects in the Andean countries).
109 See Andean Energy Alliance, COMUNIDAD ANDINA [ANDEAN COMMUNITY], http://www
.comunidadandina.org/ingles/energia/energy_1.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) [herein-
after Andean Energy Alliance]; see also WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 82, at 77–83.
110 WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 82, at 70; see also CORPORACIÓN ANDINA DE
FOMENTO (“CAF”) [ANDEAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION], http://www.caf.com/view/index
.asp?ms=19&pageMs=61502 (last visited Mar. 15, 2012); INITIATIVE FOR THE INTEGRATION
OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH AMERICA (“IIRSA”), http://www.iirsa.org/index
.asp?CodIdioma=ENG (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
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IIRSA has focused on financing eight major projects in the region
since its creation in 2000. Specifically, IIRSA has provided funding and
support for: a) the energy regulatory harmonization among Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela;111 b) strengthening the inter-
connections of Cuatricentenario-Cuestecitas and El Corozo–San Mateo
between Colombia and Venezuela;112 c) the second stage of energy inter-
connections between Ecuador and Colombia that allow the systems to
function in a synchronized manner;113 d) creating a 230 kilovolt (“KV”)
interconnection line between Pasto (Colombia) and Quito (Ecuador);114
e) creating energy interconnections between Colombia and Venezuela
through Puerto Nuevo–Puerto Páez–Puerto Carreño;115 f) constructing
new energy interconnections between Ecuador and Peru;116 g) constructing
new transmission lines within the State of Táchira (Venezuela) and new in-
terconnection points between Colombia and Venezuela;117 and h) upgrad-
ing the transmission network of west Venezuela in order to allow the
required energy integration with Colombia.118
111 See Harmonization of Electricity, Gas and Oil Regulations, INITIATIVE FOR THE
INTEGRATION OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH AMERICA, http://www.iirsa.org
/proyectos/detalle_proyecto.aspx?h=105&x=9&idioma=EN (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
112 See Strengthening of the Cuatricentenario-Cuestecitas and El Corozo–San Mateo
Interconnections, INITIATIVE FOR THE INTEGRATION OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN
SOUTH AMERICA, http://www.iirsa.org/proyectos/detalle_proyecto.aspx?h=106&x=9&idioma
=EN (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
113 See Electricity Interconnection Between Colombia and Ecuador Project, Second Stage,
INITIATIVE FOR THE INTEGRATION OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH AMERICA,
http://www.iirsa.org/proyectos/detalle_proyecto.aspx?h=116&x=9&idioma=EN (last visited
Mar. 15, 2012).
114 See Electricity Interconnection Project Between Colombia and Ecuador: A 230 KV-
Line Between Pasto (Colombia) and Quito (Ecuador) Substations, INITIATIVE FOR THE
INTEGRATION OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH AMERICA, http://www.iirsa.org
/proyectos/detalle_proyecto.aspx?h=107&x=9&idioma=EN (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
115 See Electricity Interconnection Project Between Puerto Nuevo–Puerto Páez (Venezuela)
and Puerto Carreño (Colombia), INITIATIVE FOR THE INTEGRATION OF REGIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH AMERICA, http://www.iirsa.org/proyectos/detalle_proyecto.aspx
?h=114&x=9&idioma=EN (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
116 See Electricity Interconnection Between Ecuador and Peru, INITIATIVE FOR THE
INTEGRATION OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH AMERICA, http://www.iirsa.org
/proyectos/detalle_proyecto.aspx?h=115&x=9&idioma=EN (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
117 See Uribante Caparo Project (Transmission and Generation Networks), INITIATIVE FOR
THE INTEGRATION OF REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH AMERICA, http://www.iirsa.org
/proyectos/detalle_proyecto.aspx?h=113&x=9&idioma=EN (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
118 See Electricity Transmission to Supply the West, INITIATIVE FOR THE INTEGRATION OF
REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN SOUTH AMERICA, http://www.iirsa.org/proyectos/detalle
_proyecto.aspx?h=117&x=9&idioma=EN (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
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E. Current Regulation: Decisions 608 and 536 of the Andean
Community
1. General Competition Framework: Decision 608/2005
Decision 285 was replaced in 2005 with a more comprehensive
competition regulation.119 Decision 608 was enacted with the objective of
protecting and promoting free competition, market efficiency, and con-
sumer welfare in the Andean Community.120 Decision 608 defines and es-
tablishes the conduct that will be deemed illegal within the Andean
Community and creates the Andean Committee on the Defense of Free
Competition, which is composed of a representative of the national com-
petition authority from each Member State.121 Remarkably, Decision 608
does not establish a regional merger review mechanism.122
The scope of Decision 608 specifies the covered subjects and prac-
tices and the geographical market in which it is applicable.123 In the first
case, the subjective scope is determined in Article 1 as “every legal or nat-
ural person, public or private, for-profit or non-profit purposes that offers
or demands material or immaterial goods or services in the market, as
well as the trade unions and associations that group them.”124
In a regional setting, the objective scope of application is crucial
because it determines the geographic reach of the decision and the prac-
tices that will be considered anti-competitive. Article 5 of Decision 608
limits the geographic scope to two different situations.125 First, Decision
608 is applicable to practices carried out in the territory of one or more
Member States and whose effects take place in one or more Member
States.126 Article 5 further clarifies that Decision 608 is inapplicable when
119 See Comunidad Andina [Andean Community], Guía Práctica para la Aplicación de la
Decisión 608 “Normas para la Protección y Promoción de la Libre Competencia en la
Comunidad Andina” [Practical Guide for the Application of Decision 608 “Standards for
the Protection and Promotion of Free Competition in the Andean Community”], 1, SG/dt
396 (Oct. 23, 2007) [hereinafter Guía Práctica].
120 Id. at 4.
121 Comunidad Andina [Andean Community], Decisión 608 [Decision 608], arts. 7–8, 38
(Mar. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Decisión 608].
122 See generally Decisión 608, supra note 121 (failing to discuss merger reviews); Guía
Práctica, supra note 119.
123 Guía Práctica, supra note 119, at 6.
124 Id.
125 Decisión 608, supra note 121, at art. 5.
126 Id.
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the origin is, and the effects take place, in a single country.127 Additionally,
Decision 608 is applicable when the origin of the practices is in a non-
member state and the effects happen in two or more Member States.128
Article 5 reflects that Decision 608 is based on the “pure effects
doctrine.” This doctrine “is an extension of the territoriality principle
which permits jurisdiction if the effects of conduct committed abroad
are felt within the jurisdiction of the state claiming jurisdiction.”129
Unfortunately, as there is little case law on Decision 608, the precise def-
inition of what is considered a cross-border effect has not yet been ex-
tensively developed.
Concerning the anti-competitive practices covered by Decision
608, Article 4 prohibits: a) restrictive practices and b) abuse of dominance
cases.130 If the General Secretariat finds any of the mentioned practices,
it can request the immediate cessation of the conduct and, if necessary,
impose corrective measures such as fines or other obligations.131 For de-
termining the sanctions, the General Secretariat must take into account
the gravity of the case, the dimensions of the affected market, the du-
ration of the practice, and the restrictive effect on existing or potential
competitors and consumers.132
Article 7 of Decision 608 establishes that restrictive practices are,
inter alia, agreements that have the purpose or effect of restricting com-
petition in the expanded market.133 The agreements bearing upon com-
petition presuppose a coordinated behavior and a premeditated intent
between two or more economic actors that has the effect of restricting
competition in the market.134 Another type of conduct that has a similar
effect are concerted practices.135 These practices show certain coordi-
nation among economic actors leading to unusual market conditions.136
This last group includes parallel practices by companies, with or without
an express agreement among them.137 The agreements and concerted prac-
tices covered are the ones which have the purpose or effect of: a) fixing
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 164 (1994).
130 Decisión 608, supra note 121, at arts. 4, 7, 8.
131 Id. at art. 34.
132 Id.
133 Guía Práctica, supra note 119, at 9.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 10.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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prices or other commercial conditions directly or indirectly; b) restricting
the supply or demand of goods or services; c) segmenting markets for goods
or services; d) impeding the access or permanence of existing or potential
competitors in the market; and e) bid rigging.138
Article 9 defines the cases in which one or more actors are consid-
ered to have a dominant position in the relevant market.139 This situation
arises when the actor is capable of restricting, affecting, or distorting
supply or demand in the market in a substantial manner, without the
possibility that other existing or potential actors or consumers are able to
change that situation.140 This provision is founded on the economic con-
cept of market power, which is “the ability of a company profitably to raise
prices above competitive levels for a significant period of time” without
losing market share.141 Market power is also present when a supplier is
able to lower prices below competitive levels in order to drive out compet-
itors and then raise prices above competitive levels.142 Having a dominant
position is not a violation per se of Decision 608; rather, the infraction
arises when the actor abuses its dominant position.143
Decision 608 contains a list of actions that are presumed to be an
abuse of dominance: a) predatory price-fixing; b) the unjustified imposition
of exclusive distribution agreements; c) the subordination of contracts to
tying agreements that are not related to the object of such contracts; d) the
imposition of discriminatory conditions upon third parties, putting them
in a situation of competitive disadvantage; e) the unjustified refusal to
contract; f) inciting third parties to refrain from entering into contracts;
and g) any conduct that impedes the access or permanence of existing or
potential competitors for reasons other than economic efficiency.144
Nevertheless, Decision 608 allows Member States to temporarily
exclude certain economic activities from its scope, subject to the approval
of the Commission of the Andean Community.145 This possibility was fores-
een for sensible economic activities and only when: a) the activity creates
significant benefits for producing or distributing goods or services or en-
hances economic progress; b) the activity provides special conditions to
138 Decisión 608, supra note 121, at art. 7.
139 Id. at art. 9.
140 Id.
141 PHILIP RAPHALS, HELIOS CENTRE, THE EVOLUTION OF COMPETITIVE ENERGY MARKETS
IN NORTH AMERICA 44 (2005).
142 Id.
143 Guía Práctica, supra note 119, at 12.
144 Decisión 608, supra note 121, at art. 8.
145 Guía Práctica, supra note 119, at 21.
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depressed regions or to economically sensitive activities; and c) the ex-
clusion does not completely eliminate competition in the production,
distribution, or supply of the covered goods or services.146
2. Energy Integration Framework: Decision 536/2002
Integrating the energy industries in the Andean countries re-
quired regulating the interconnection of the electricity markets and the
electricity transactions among countries.147 For this reason, the Andean
Community decided to enact Decision 536 on December 19, 2002.148 The
purpose of Decision 536 is to develop the energy sector in the Andean
region, to promote the construction and development of infrastructure—
including power plants and transmission networks of common use—and
to create a single regional transmission system.149
Decision 536 sets out the following rules: a) intra-communitarian
trade in energy will not be restricted by price discrimination between
national and foreign markets, subsidies, tariffs, or any other kind of re-
strictions; b) non-discriminatory access to international interconnected
lines is guaranteed; c) free contracting is allowed among the electricity
market agents; d) short-term IETs are permitted and should only be
limited by the capacity of the international links; e) revenue that may
arise from congestion at the interconnection link shall not be credited
to the owner of such interconnection link; and f) Member States will en-
sure competitive conditions in the electricity market with prices reflect-
ing economic efficiency, and will avoid discriminatory practices and
abuse of dominance.150
From a competition law perspective, the obligation establishing
non-discriminatory access to interconnection lines reflects the “essential
facilities doctrine,” according to which owners of an “essential” or “bottle-
neck” facility must provide access to that facility to competitors at a
reasonable price.151 This concept is particularly important in network
industries that contain natural monopolies, such as electricity, gas, and
146 Id.
147 Comunidad Andina [Andean Community], Decisión 536 [Decision 536], pmbl. (Dec. 19,
2002) [hereinafter Decisión 536].
148 Id.
149 See WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 82, at 43–44.
150 Id. at 43; see also Decisión 536, supra note 147, at art. 1.
151 SIMON BISHOP & MIKE WALKER, THE ECONOMICS OF EC COMPETITION LAW: CONCEPTS,
APPLICATION AND MEASUREMENT 238 (2002).
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telecommunications.152 This doctrine is important when a company has
created vertical integration by owning an essential facility active in the
upstream and downstream supply of two related activities, and then re-
fuses to provide access or services to a competitor that wishes to supply
in only one of these activities.153 The main reason for considering a re-
fusal to supply as anti-competitive is that it prevents third parties from
entering the market, with the effect of lessening competition.154
Since the essential facilities doctrine affects the property rights
of the owner of the facility, it is usually applied in a restricted manner.155
An asset must fulfill five conditions in order to be considered an essen-
tial facility.156 “First, it must be impossible or at least uneconomic for
any other firm to replicate the asset . . . .”157 Second, “there should be
no alternative means of entering the relevant market at a reasonable
cost.”158 Third, the asset must have spare capacity to provide increasing
supply to the relevant market, and not merely to substitute for the ca-
pacity of the incumbent.159 Fourth, the relevant market must lack ef-
fective competition.160 Finally, the owner of the essential facility must
compete in the same relevant market as the potential entrant.161
An effective essential facilities doctrine not only imposes on the
incumbent the obligation to grant access to its competitors, but also in-
volves detailed price regulation.162 Without any further regulation, the
owner of the asset would effectively keep competitors out of the relevant
market by charging an excessively high price.163
However, the essential facilities doctrine does not solve certain
problems of non-price discrimination, such as “delaying the introduction
of new services, delaying the processing of orders, or providing detailed
advance information to the vertically-integrated operator’s own down-
stream business operations before making it available to competing down-
stream customers . . . .”164 Therefore, more burdensome competition law
152 Id. at 238–39.
153 Id. at 239.
154 Id.
155 See id. at 240.
156 Id. at 242.
157 BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 151, at 242.
158 Id. at 243.
159 See id.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 244.
162 Id.
163 BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 151, at 244.
164 European Regulators Grp., supra note 13, at 6.
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remedies, such as the functional separation requirement, may be required
to solve the competition-related challenges.165
Functional separation is designed to avoid price and non-price
discrimination abuses by the owner of an essential facility.166 Under this
remedy, the parts of the network that are impossible or uneconomic to
replicate are separated into different business units.167 Once separated,
these parts are managed separately from the rest of the company.168 In
order to work, functional separation must be designed to ensure that “the
separated part of the company is provided with local incentives that en-
courage it to act in the interests of all its customers, both internal and
external, and not in the interests of its parent company.”169 Decision 536
does not establish a functional separation requirement.170
In the context of the United States, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) considers that functional separation is necessary
for providing confidence to other users of the transmission system that the
transmission operator will not favor its own affiliates at the expense of
other users.171 The separate business unit that functional separation cre-
ates must ensure a separation of functions, employees, and information.172
In the first case, the objective is keeping apart the functions of the up-
stream and downstream business units of the company in order to ensure
that the upstream ones provide services on a non-discriminatory basis.173
In the second case, separating employees requires imposing mobility re-
strictions within the company, physically separating the offices and, impor-
tantly, paying incentives to compete.174 Finally, information must also be
set apart by creating different information systems for the various business
units in the company.175 Furthermore, the FERC encourages the addition-
al step of creating an Independent System Operator (“ISO”), which is a
non-profit organization that controls and operates—but does not own—
the transmission system.176
165 See id. at 8.
166 Id. at 6.
167 Id. at 2.
168 See id. at 2–3.
169 Jason Whalley & Peter Curwen, Is Functional Separation BT-Style the Answer?, COMM.
& STRATEGIES, Third Quarter 2008, 145, 146–47.
170 See generally Decisión 536, supra note 147.
171 RAPHALS, supra note 141, at 38.
172 European Regulators Grp., supra note 13, at 4.
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 RAPHALS, supra note 141, at 38.
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Another important objective of Decision 536 is enhancing IETs.177
In this regard, Articles 2 and 3 of Decision 536 establish that a license to
engage in IETs must be automatically granted when a party has fulfilled
all the requirements according to its internal legislation.178 Moreover,
when an agent is already authorized to make IETs in one Member State,
the license will be automatically extended for operating in the rest of the
Member States.179
With respect to international links, Decision 536 establishes that,
in order to incentivize the development of this important infrastructure,
Member States can establish special mechanisms to remunerate trans-
mission services at their borders.180 In addition, Member States will co-
ordinate efforts for the construction of such international links, including
joint procurement.181
In order to better regulate IETs among Andean countries, Article 19
of Decision 536 exhorts Member States to make the necessary changes in
their legislation to promote harmonization of the rules governing interna-
tional interconnections and IETs.182 This harmonization was completed
between Colombia and Ecuador in 2003.183
Decision 536 states that the energy production of one Member State
will, as a whole, compete with the energy domestic suppliers in another
Member State.184 Therefore, energy will be dispatched in a coordinated
manner among countries and will not be subject to an energy production
surplus.185 Moreover, IETs will only be limited by the capacity of inter-
national links.186
Additionally, Decision 536 creates the Andean Committee of
Electric Service Policy-Setting and Regulatory Agencies (“CANREL” by
its acronym in Spanish), charged with the task of enacting the legal
provisions necessary to attain the objectives set out in Decision 536.187 It
is composed of representatives from each national energy regulatory
authority.188 Other regional bodies have also been created for the purpose
177 See Decisión 536, supra note 147, at pmbl.
178 Id. at art. 2.
179 Id. at art. 3.
180 Id. at art. 7.
181 Id. at art. 10.
182 Id. at art. 19.
183 Andean Energy Alliance, supra note 109.
184 See Decisión 536, supra note 147, at art. 1.
185 Id. at arts. 12–13.
186 Id. at art. 13.
187 Id. at art. 20.
188 Id.
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of adequately handling energy integration in the region; namely, the
Working Group of Electric Service Regulatory Agencies (“GTOR” by its
acronym in Spanish) and the Working Group of Electric Service Policy-
Setting Agencies (“GOPLAN” by its acronym in Spanish).189 CANREL has
discussed several issues to fine-tune the current legislation. These have in-
cluded the improvement of the interconnection status among the Andean
countries,190 the coordinated energy dispatch,191 and the proper treatment
of congestion rents.192
III. EUROPEAN UNION
A. Historical Overview
Since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community by
the Treaty of Paris in 1951,193 competition law has played a major role in
European integration.194 The Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, founded the
European Economic Community (“EEC”) and included as one of its goals
“the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the common mar-
ket is not distorted.”195 Consequently, this treaty included some provisions
to achieve that objective. Articles 85 and 86 were designed to address pri-
vate restraints on competition, and Article 90 was designed to regulate gov-
ernmental restraints.196
However, since the creation of the EEC, there has been agreement
that in some sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, transport, and
energy, the application of competition rules should be nuanced to provide
189 Andean Energy Alliance, supra note 109.
190 See generally Comunidad Andina [Andean Community], Acta de la Primera Reunión
del Consejo de Ministros de Energía, Electricidad, Hidrocarburos y Minas de la Comunidad
Andina [Minutes of the First Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Energy, Electricity,
Hydrocarbons and Mines of the Andean Community], SG/CM.EEHM/IACTA (June 7, 2004).
191 See generally Comunidad Andina [Andean Community], Acta de la III Reunión del
Consejo de Ministros de Energía, Electricidad, Hidrocarburos y Minas de la Comunidad
Andina [Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Council of Ministers of Energy, Electricity,
Hydrocarbons and Mines of the Andean Community], SG/CM.EEHM/III/ACTA (Oct. 5, 2005).
192 Id.
193 DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING
PROMETHEUS 335 (1998).
194 Id.
195 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 3(f), Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter European Economic Community Treaty].
196 GERBER, supra note 193, at 344.
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room for other potentially conflicting goals.197 In the case of network
utilities, the objective of providing universal coverage to all societal groups
required that a provider with a universal service obligation should be, to a
certain extent, protected from competition and allowed to cross-subsidize
certain groups of customers.198
B. Legal Framework
The first substantial steps toward the integration of the electric-
ity and gas markets in Europe materialized in Directives 96/92/EC and
98/30/EC, which introduced common rules for the electricity and gas
markets, respectively.199 Nonetheless, it was soon clear that, although
necessary, common rules by themselves were not sufficient to create a
single European market.200 As a result, the second Electricity and Gas
Directives—2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC—were enacted in 2003, making
progress toward harmonizing national regulatory frameworks.201 These
Directives were complemented by Regulations—1228/2003 for electricity
and 1775/2005 for gas—which dealt with the integration of national mar-
kets and cross-border exchanges in electricity and natural gas.202
In fact, the Electricity Directive (Directive 2003/54) provided for
full liberalization of the electricity market of the European Union (“EU”)
by July 2004 for all non-household customers and by July 2007 for all
customers.203 The Electricity Directive sets common rules for the gener-
ation, transmission, distribution, and supply of electricity.204 In addition,
it contains important competition-related provisions to ensure legal un-
bundling of transmission and distribution system operators.205 Moreover,
the Directive ensures non-discriminatory access to networks and imposes
obligations on Member States to ensure universal service to all house-
hold customers.206
197 See Christopher Brown, Manish Das & Ben Rayment, Sectoral Regimes, in BELLAMY &
CHILD EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW OF COMPETITION 1071, 1072 (Peter Roth QC & Vivien
Rose eds., 6th ed. 2008).
198 Id.
199 EVERIS & MERCADOS ENERGY MARKETS INTERNATIONAL, FROM REGIONAL MARKETS TO
A SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 16 (2010) [hereinafter MERCADOS EMI].
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Council Directive 2003/54, art. 21, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 37 [hereinafter Directive 2003/54].
204 Id. at art. 1; Brown et al., supra note 197, at 1104.
205 Directive 2003/54, supra note 203, at art. 10; Brown et al., supra note 197, at 1104.
206 Directive 2003/54, supra note 203, at art. 3; Brown et al., supra note 197, at 1104.
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The Electricity Transit Regulation (Regulation 1228/2003) creates
a common framework for cross-border transactions and the allocation
of available interconnection capacity in order to avoid congestion among
countries.207 The Electricity Transit Regulation was adopted with a view
to regulating the conditions for access to the network for cross-border
exchanges of electricity.208
The latest set of EU regulations, adopted in June 2009, is the so-
called “3rd package,” comprising two Directives and three Regulations. It
has three main objectives: a) to effectively unbundle vertically integrated
energy utilities; b) to facilitate the delivery of massive energy investment;
and c) to improve the functioning of markets and customer rights.209 It cre-
ates the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators which will
act in the consumers’ interest and work together with national regulators
to remove persistent obstacles to a single EU energy market.210
C. Functioning of the European Electricity Market
The European electricity market is structured in different regions,
each of them with one or more energy exchanges.211 An energy exchange
is a marketplace in which derivatives, commodities, securities and other
financial instruments related to energy are traded.212 The main function
of the European electricity market “is to ensure fair and orderly trading,
as well as efficient dissemination of price information . . . .”213 The appeal
of an exchange-based market is that trading is facilitated through standar-
dized products, and market information and liquidity are promoted.214
Moreover, “[e]xchanges also provide other benefits, such as a neutral
marketplace, a neutral price reference, easy access, low transaction costs,
a safe counterpart, anonymity and clearing and settlement service.
207 Id. at 1105.
208 Id.
209 EUR. ENERGY REGULATORS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN ENERGY
REGULATORS 8 (2009), available at http://www.energy-regulators.eu/portal/page/portal
/EER_HOME/EER_PUBLICATIONS/ANNUAL%20REPORTS/AR2008/ergeg_%20ceer
%20annual%20report%2009.pdf.
210 Id.
211 See generally KOEN RADEMAEKERS ET AL., ECORYS NEDERLAND BV, REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS OF EU WHOLESALE ENERGY MARKETS: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT DATA
ANALYSIS OF EU WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY, GAS, AND CO2 MARKETS 17–29 (2008)
(providing an overview of the European power market).
212 Id. at 12.
213 Id.
214 Id.
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Furthermore, exchanges provide a benchmark reference for both over-
the-counter and bilateral trading.”215
Exchanges usually operate the day-ahead market or the intra-day
market.216 Both of them can be considered spot markets because energy
is traded and delivered in the short term.217 In the day-ahead market,
“bids are submitted and the market is cleared on the day before actual
delivery.”218 Intra-day trading, on the other hand, allows participants to
fine-tune their positions in light of new information on their own pro-
duction and consumption position.219 Participants are willing to enter
into intra-day trading to ensure that: a) they have exploited all profitable
opportunities for generation; and b) their contracted energy position is
close to their expected physical energy position.220
In terms of volume, the European electricity market is not equally
divided among exchanges nor types of contracts.221 There are seven region-
al energy markets.222 All of them make part of the Electricity Regional
Initiative (“ERI”), guided by the European Regulators Group for Electricity
and Gas (“ERGEG”) in 2006 with a view to moving the EU closer to an in-
tegrated electricity market.223 These regional markets have been able to
move at different speeds and to address their own priorities, while still
having EU-wide industry legislation and the coordinating role of ERGEG
to ensure progress in a consistent manner.224
Moreover, the ERI has served the purpose of allowing each region
to focus on practical issues that are needed for cross-border trade.225 Among
others, the regional groups are addressing the following issues: a) intercon-
nection, congestion management, and capacity allocation; b) transparency
of supply and demand; c) the development of liquid trading points; and
d) integration and interoperability.226
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 See RADEMAEKERS ET AL., supra note 211, at 12.
218 Id.
219 FRONTIER ECON. & CONSENTEC, BENEFITS AND PRACTICAL STEPS TOWARDS THE
INTEGRATION OF INTRADAY ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND BALANCING MECHANISMS 4 (2005).
220 Id. at 4–5.
221 MERCADOS EMI, supra note 199, at 6–7 (noting the differences between regional en-
ergy markets).
222 See id. at 6.
223 See id.
224 Id. at 6–7.
225 See id.
226 MOFFAT ASSOC. PARTNERSHIP, REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF EU WHOLESALE ENERGY
MARKETS 7 (2008).
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Above all, dealing with congestion management is a fundamental
step toward the development of a single market.227 The creation of a single
market implies having good interconnection capacity and giving the mar-
ket its most efficient use.228 Therefore, as cross-border trade increases,
there is a need to develop congestion management methods to efficiently
allocate the available cross-border capacity.229 Congestion management re-
quires handling the following aspects: a) capacity calculation; b) long-term
capacity allocation; c) day-ahead capacity allocation; and d) intra-day ca-
pacity allocation.230
Further, transparency is considered essential for the effective func-
tioning of an electricity market because it helps to level the playing field
for all market participants, including smaller traders without access to
information.231 Accordingly, the EU has consistently sought to reduce in-
formation asymmetries.232 Regulations 1228/2003 and 714/2009 define
ex-ante and ex-post demand information, production information, and infor-
mation on the availability and use of the networks and interconnections.233
Moreover, the need to have adequate market liquidity in electricity
is crucial for enhancing competition in the market. This is particularly
challenging in a regional setting because of variations in liquidity between
different national markets and the strong inverse relationship between the
levels of market concentration and the degree of liquidity.234 The following
measures are considered important to enhance market liquidity: a) incen-
tives to encourage more investment in interconnections; b) the removal of
regulated end-user prices; and c) harmonization of rules regarding the
transmission system operators.235
Finally, energy integration in Europe has also focused on increas-
ing the degree of interconnectedness among some key power exchanges:
a) Powernext, APX and Belpex (France, the Netherlands and Belgium); and
b) within the NordPool area (Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark).236
This process entails “managing their respective supply and purchase
curves jointly, by matching the highest purchase bids and lowest sale
227 MERCADOS EMI, supra note 199, at 27.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 29.
231 Id. at 44.
232 See id. at 44–45.
233 MERCADOS EMI, supra note 199, at 45.
234 MOFFAT ASSOC. PARTNERSHIP, supra note 226, at 6.
235 Id.
236 RADEMAEKERS ET AL., supra note 211, at 26.
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bids, regardless of where they have been made (eg. matching a purchase
bid in Belgium with a sales bid in France), but taking into account the
available interconnection capacities on the borders.”237 As a result, the
border power flows among countries have improved by setting the energy
flows in the right direction.238 Thus, when congestion is fully eliminated,
energy markets will merge to create a truly single zone with one price
and shared liquidity.239
IV. CHALLENGES AND PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE ANDEAN
ENERGY INTEGRATION
A. Challenges
Although great efforts have been made to enhance competition
and energy integration in the Andean region, many challenges still exist.
According to the World Energy Council, the main energy integration chal-
lenges for the Andean region include: a) lowering the existing regulatory
and institutional barriers to make the legal systems compatible with each
other; b) maintaining and improving the mix of regional energy sources;
and c) enhancing regional energy security by establishing joint manage-
ment of natural gas and hydropower reservoirs.240
In addition to those challenges, it is necessary to reinforce the
institutional setting by further regulating, supplying information, and su-
pervising. The objective is avoiding legal and institutional clashes among
the Member States. In particular, there should be a body in charge of coor-
dinating the operations of the dispatch operators of each Andean country
(Centro Nacional de Despacho—“CND”—in Colombia, Comité de Operación
Económica de los Sistemas—“COES”—in Peru, Oficina de Operación de
Sistemas Interconectados—“OASIS”—in Venezuela and Corporación Centro
Nacional de Control de Energía—“CENACE”—in Ecuador).241 This body
should be in charge of developing agreements regarding the quality prin-
ciples that must be kept in supplying the service.242
237 Id. at 28.
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The Working Group of Electric Service Regulatory Agencies
(“GTOR”) has also highlighted some aspects that the Member States
should take into account when revising Decision 536.243 First, Member
States must determine how to address an energy shortage in one or more
countries.244 Second, countries have to clarify what will happen with the
congestion rents arising out of limited capacity at the interconnection
links.245 Third, Member States must determine whether legal unbundling
for vertically integrated energy companies will be mandatory or optional.246
Finally, Member States must decide how to distribute the costs of up-
grading the internal energy networks.247
B. Proposals to Improve Integration
Energy integration in the Andean Community still requires work
in many different areas. Andean energy integration needs to focus on fur-
ther developing the following four aspects: a) enhancing regional energy
liberalization; b) reducing market concentration; c) impeding abuse of the
network’s operator dominant position; and d) better complementing com-
petition law with regulatory policy.
1. Liberalization Measures
a. Creating a Single Energy Market and a Regional Independent
Regulator
As mentioned before, Decision 536 of the Andean Community sets
forth a normative framework aimed at regulating the interconnection of
electricity markets and enhancing IETs among Andean countries.248
Despite the valuable work of Decision 536, it is only a first step in the
right direction. Greater aspirations are needed. Decision 536 never in-
tended to create a single energy market for the region, and this objective
should be the first item in the reform agenda. Only the establishment of a
single Andean energy market will lead to real competition in a regional
243 Comunidad Andina [Andean Community], Vigesimo Segunda Reunión del Grupo de
los Organismos Reguladores de la Comunidad Andina [22nd Meeting of the Group of
Andean Community Regulatory Organizations], 1, SG/GTOR/XXII/ACTA (July 6, 2010).
244 See id. at 2.
245 See id.
246 See id.
247 See id.
248 ANDESCO, supra note 104, at 3.
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market. Therefore, future regional legislation should set the roadmap for
attaining a single regional market. This objective should be gradually
sought and will require a transition period to allow national legislations
to converge.
As a second step, Member States should create a single independ-
ent energy regulator for the entire region. Currently, Decision 536 cre-
ates three different bodies—CANREL, GTOR, and GOPLAN—to coordinate
the regulatory decisions in each country and to create common rules for the
region.249 However, this arrangement only works in today’s market. A sin-
gle market would require a regional energy regulator in order to fully grasp
the advantages of liberalization and competition. The regulator should be
independent from the national governments and the domestic regulators
of the Member States. It should be a supranational body at the same level
as the Commission of the Andean Community or the Court of Justice of the
Andean Community. The regulator should receive a clear mandate from the
Andean countries and should have all the institutional means to pursue
it. Indeed, close cooperation with domestic regulators is crucial. Opening
spaces for sharing experiences and information is fundamental for a suc-
cessful outcome.
b. Enhancing Competition at the Wholesale Level Through a
Regional Exchange
Energy liberalization in the Andean region requires an institu-
tional environment in which undertakings from the four Member States
are able to compete. Such an environment requires the creation of a single
energy exchange for the entire Andean Community. The objective is en-
hancing competition by allowing generators throughout the Member
States to compete with each other and thus, push the market towards
efficiency. Moreover, the creation of a regional exchange would allow the
Andean region to use its weather and geographic complementarities by
setting a common playing field for both thermal and hydroelectric power.
As mentioned in the context of the European Union, the importance of
an exchange-based market is the creation of a neutral marketplace with
enough liquidity and low transaction costs.250 This exchange market nec-
essarily implies promoting market information because market players
need to carefully calculate their intra-day and inter-day positions on the
basis of that information.251
249 Id. at 2.
250 See RADEMAEKERS ET AL., supra note 211, at 12.
251 See id.
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The creation of a single Andean energy exchange should be done
progressively to allow national legislations to converge and the network
capacity to be improved. The development of this power exchange should
be accompanied with a strong and efficient supranational dispute settle-
ment system. This is required to solve all the potential conflicts that might
arise out of the IETs. This would help market players have confidence in
the institutional setting and the enforceability of the transactions done
at the exchange.
2. Market Structure and Concentration
a. Differences in Market Structures and Cross-Border Merger
Review
Each Member of the Andean Community has a domestic energy
market with differences in the number of economic agents, their size, the
sources used to produce energy—for example, thermal or hydroelectric—
and the state of the transmission networks.252
The largest markets usually have the biggest economic agents and
when markets are liberalized, these companies usually try to deter com-
petition by abusing their position in the market.253 Creating a regional
market and allowing the largest operators from the largest countries—for
example, Peru or Colombia—to manipulate the market would be counter-
productive. Smaller operators from both large and small countries need
to be able to effectively compete in the market. Thus, taking into account
each country’s market structure is necessary for tailoring the rules and
sequencing of a new regional market.
Closely related to market structure is the issue of cross-border
mergers. As mentioned before, Decision 608 of the Andean Community
does not grant any jurisdiction to the Andean Secretariat, nor to any
other regional body, to review mergers in the region.254 As a result, inte-
grating the energy markets could simply lead to mergers among the larg-
est undertakings with the effect of significantly precluding competition.
In order to avoid this, merger review should be included under the juris-
diction of the Andean Community.
252 Energy, COMUNIDAD ANDINA [ANDEAN COMMUNITY], http://www.comunidadandina.org
/ingles/energy.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
253 See FURSE, supra note 12, at 223–24.
254 See generally Decisión 608, supra note 121.
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3. Abuse of the Network Operators’ De Facto Dominant Position
a. Differentiating the Different Segments of the Market:
From Legal Unbundling to Functional Separation
Although the Andean Community has made great efforts to es-
tablish a set of rules governing competition law and energy integration,
there are some aspects that remain missing in the legislation. The en-
actment of common rules for the generation, transmission, distribution,
and supply of electricity is of particular importance. The EU created such
rules in the Electricity Directive (2003/54/EC).255 The current framework
contained in Decision 536 only sets out certain rules regarding IETs, non-
discriminatory access to networks, interconnection points and transmis-
sion agents, without establishing deeper competition-oriented provisions.
The European Union focused on ensuring legal unbundling of
transmission system operators and distribution system operators.256 This
approach clearly aims at mitigating the possibility that economic agents
exercise market power and thus hinder competition in the market. Some
Andean countries already have similar internal legislation in place which
could serve as inspiration for a new regional regulation. For instance, in
Laws 142 and 143 of 1994, Colombia divided its electricity industry in
the four mentioned activities.257 The same approach was taken in Peru
through Supreme Decree No. 27-95-ITINCI of October 19, 1995.258 Under
the unbundling regime, energy generators are not able to provide trans-
mission or distribution services and vice versa.259 The same limitation
applies for transmission and distribution operators.260
Moreover, the mentioned domestic laws also establish ownership
and market-share limitations to avoid market power. With respect to
generation, distribution and supply of electricity, the Colombian Energy
Regulator (“CREG” by its acronym in Spanish) established that none of
255 See Directive 2003/54, supra note 203.
256 Id. at pmbl.
257 L. 142/94, julio 11, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.), available at http://www
.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley/1994/ley_0142_1994.html [hereinafter Law
142]; L. 143/94, julio 11, 1994, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.), available at http://
www.secretariasenado.gov.co/senado/basedoc/ley/1994/ley_0143_1994.html [hereinafter
Law 143].
258 IGNACIO DE LEÓN, LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY: A POLICY IN
SEARCH OF IDENTITY 190 (2001).
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260 See generally Law 142, supra note 257; Law 143, supra note 257.
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these undertakings can participate in more than twenty-five percent of
their respective activities in Colombia.261 Equally important, generators
cannot own more than twenty-five percent of a distribution company and
vice versa.262 In principle, neither generators nor distributors are allowed
to invest in transmission enterprises.263 However, there is an exception
for those enterprises that did so before the enactment of Law 142 in
1994.264 These enterprises can own up to fifteen percent of a transmission
enterprise.265 Therefore, it is important that future Andean legislation
contains ownership limitations across the production chain to tackle ver-
tical integration problems.
If it is not politically feasible to establish legal unbundling require-
ments, another possibility to create integration is the functional separation
requirement. This requirement serves the purpose of avoiding the exer-
cise of monopoly power in the natural monopoly segments without legally
separating companies. In this scenario, the functional separation obligation
would require vertically integrated utilities to set apart their transmission
and energy marketing functions, giving the former segment to an indepen-
dent system operator.266
b. Third-Party Access
Although market structure is important, in the case of network in-
dustries, the focus should be on the problems of interconnection. The main
objective is safeguarding the existence of effective and non-discriminatory
interconnection conditions for all the agents in the market.267 As mentioned
before, “[g]iven that the existence of a natural monopoly gives market
power to the operator of the utility, it is necessary to ensure that this power
will not be misused by excluding potential upstream or downstream com-
petitors whose access to the network is necessary.”268
Decision 536 establishes that non-discriminatory access to inter-
national interconnected lines is guaranteed.269 However, it does not foresee
261 Ministerio de Minas y Energía [Ministry of Mines and Energy], Resolución No. 128
[Resolution No. 128], art. 3, Dec. 17, 1996.
262 Id. at art. 4.
263 Id. at arts. 4–6.
264 Id. at art. 6.
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266 RAPHALS, supra note 141, at 38.
267 See DE LEÓN, supra note 258, at 186.
268 Id. at 190.
269 Decisión 536, supra note 147, at art. 1.
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any rules for effectively regulating scarcity problems at the international
link.270 Without clear rules and a proper enforcing capacity, the owner of
the international link can still exercise its monopoly power to deter IETs
from its competitors to favor its own energy dispatches.
c. Congestion Management
As cross-border trade increases, there is a need to develop conges-
tion management methods to efficiently allocate the available cross-border
capacity. Congestion management requires handling the following aspects:
a) capacity calculation; b) long-term capacity allocation; c) day-ahead ca-
pacity allocation; and d) intra-day capacity allocation.271 As previously
mentioned, Decision 536 does not contain a comprehensive regulation on
the subject.272 Article 1 subsection 10 does not set the criteria to allocate
the congestion rents.273 It only establishes that these rents will not be
allocated to the owner of the international link.274 GTOR has recom-
mended that these rents should be allocated to the exporting country;
however, there has not been consensus on the matter and no decision has
yet been made.275
In the European Union, Regulation 1228/2003 establishes a set
of rules that could serve as inspiration for the Andean context.276 This
regulation states that all remunerations from congestion rents must be:
a) destined to guaranteeing energy availability; b) destined to upgrading
the network or the interconnection capacity; and c) taken into account
when calculating the revenues of energy companies, which are the basis
for fixing new transmission tariffs.277
4. Competition Law and Regulation
Addressing the different challenges in the energy industry re-
quires using a combination of competition law and regulatory policy. In
one respect, regulation provides the ex ante legal framework that firms
270 See generally id.
271 MERCADOS EMI, supra note 199, at 29.
272 See generally Decisión 536, supra note 147.
273 Id. at art. 1.
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276 Commission Regulation 1228/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 176) 1.
277 Id. at art. 6.
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in the market need to follow. Generally, regulation focuses only on the
main aspects of the business conduct. The most important aspects in the
energy industry under the umbrella of regulation are: a) third-party ac-
cess to the essential facilities; b) congestion management; and c) capacity
and transport charges. On the other hand, competition law deals with
anti-competitive conducts and is only enforced on an ex-post basis.
As explained throughout this document, regulation and compe-
tition complement each other by focusing on the sectors that are most
efficient. For instance, imposing price regulation on a natural monopoly—
for example, energy transmission—makes it unnecessary to enforce the
prohibition of abuse of a dominant or monopoly position in order to prevent
“excessive prices.”278 The introduction of competition at the wholesale level
is crucial for improving the efficiency of the market. The same result could
hardly be achieved through regulation. Introducing competition into the
natural monopoly segments, such as transmission and distribution, would
only lead to a waste of important resources. Therefore, understanding
that the energy industry must be designed, planned, and supervised with
these two policy instruments is fundamental for improving the Andean
energy industry.
CONCLUSION
This Article sought to describe a complex industry in a complex
context with a view to making concrete proposals to improve economic
efficiency in a region that much needs it. The electricity industry in the
Andean region was mismanaged for a long time. Several structural re-
forms have been undertaken in the past decades with impressive results.
However, certain deficiencies in the system still remain. Therefore, it is
necessary to have a better understanding of the specificities of the Andean
energy sector. Only by doing so will it be possible to make effective and
concrete proposals that will lead to a better legal framework and insti-
tutions for the Andean energy industry.
The energy conditions of the region show that energy demand will
increase and that the natural conditions to create a promising industry do
exist. Therefore, the challenge is to structure the industry in the most effi-
cient manner to avoid the misallocation of resources, and to exploit the com-
plementarities of the different types of energy produced in each country.
278 INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN REGULATED SECTORS
WORKING GROUP 3–4 (2004).
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Improving the Andean energy industry will require drawing on
certain experiences from the European Union, since this regional organi-
zation has already accomplished a considerable level of energy integration.
The proposals made at the end of this document were also inspired by the
domestic legislation of certain Andean countries. This shows that these
countries have gradually embraced some of the regulatory reforms needed
to have an efficient energy industry. Thus, the main remaining task is to
transpose and adapt these reforms to the regional context while pursuing
deeper integration. This Article has sought to shed light upon some of the
issues required to achieve this objective and to increase awareness of
its importance. Hopefully, the small contribution of this author will be
followed by further research and practical applications in a region where
custom-made measures and more ambitious aims are needed.
